The thesis that the mental is supervenient on the physical – roughly, the claim that the mental character of a thing is wholly determined by its physical nature – has played a key role in the formulation of some influential positions on the mind-body problem, in particular versions of non-reductive physicalism. This is the kind of mind-body supervenience i will be arguing against the formal notion of supervenience, as outlined by kim, has three versions, the weak, strong and the global i outline only the weak and strong versions below, because kim equates the global with the strong one. Materialist and panexperientialist physician: a critique of jaegwon kim’s supervenience and mind of the thesis of the mind’s supervenience upon the body . The essays focus on such issues as the nature of causation and events, what dependency relations other than causal relations connect facts and events, the analysis of supervenience, and the mind-body problem.
Thus construed, the mind–body supervenience thesis is interpreted as a theory of mind, and not as an ontological claim equivalent to that made by materialism, which would preclude there being a non-physical being 7 the claim roughly. Jaegwon kim is one of the most preeminent and most influential contributors to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics this collection of essays presents the core of his work on supervenience and mind with two sets of postscripts especially written for the book. Supervenience physicalism attempts to combine non-reductionism about properties with a physical determination thesis in such a way as to ensure physicalism i argue that this attempt is unsuccessful: the specific supervenience relation in question is either strong enough to ensure reductionism, as in the case of strong supervenience, or too weak to yield physical determination, as in the case of global supervenience.
Critical notice of jaegwon kim’s supervenience and mind this is only a special case of the general thesis that all the facts about the body’s causal . Notre dame philosophical reviews is an electronic, the mind-body relation then this appears to be a statement of the second logical supervenience thesis . Given this, kim, along with many other philosophers, has concluded that supervenience is not a solution to the mind-body problem, but instead expresses the very problem itself in light of this, many have lost their enthusiasm for this idea. The essays focus on such issues as the nature of causation and events, what dependency relations other than causal relations connect facts and events, the analysis of supervenience, and the mind—body problem a central problem in the philosophy of mind is the problem of explaining how the mind can causally influence bodily processes.
The identity theory of mind holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain concepts, theories and the mind-body . As part of his ongoing critique of metaphysical realism, hilary putnam has recently argued that current materialist theories of mind that locate mental phenomena in the brain can make no sense of the proposed identifications of mental states with physical (or physical cum computational) states, or of the supervenience of mental properties with physical properties. Philosophy of mind restoring mind-brain supervenience: a proposal robert g lantin university of montreal [email protected] abstract: in this paper i examine the claim that mental causation — at least for cases involving the production of purposive behavior — is possible only if ‘mind/brain supervenience’ obtains, and suggest that in spite of all the bad press it has . Consequently, there is a push in the physicalist camp for an ontologically more robust supervenience, a “superdupervenience,” that ensures that properties supervening on physical properties are physicalistically acceptable.
Supervenience, the view there can be no mental changes without corresponding physical changes, is the theoretical framework within which i examine mental causation specifically, i argue against one salient assumption of supervenience, namely, that there are separate ontological categories for the mental and the physical. Implies the supervenience thesis (a) - assuming that the modality involved in the concept of supervenience is satisfied by the nomological modality in the statement of the correlation thesis thus, anyone who accepts the correlation thesis would be committed to the doctrine of psychophysical supervenience. Beyond supervenience: an alternative approach to the mental-physical copies of this thesis in (especially as it applies to mind-body supervenience) .
Supervenience ever since donald davidson introduced the notion of supervenience within the philosophy of mind in 1970, it has come to play a key role in philosophical discussions regarding reducibility and the ontological structure of the world in general. This point is sometimes expressed by saying that supervenience physicalism is a position on the mind-body problem influential in the first forty years of the . Horgan’s “from supervenience to superdupervenience: meeting the demands of a material world” [horgan 1993], brian mclaughlin’s “varieties of supervenience” [mclaughlin 1995], and paul teller’s “a poor man’s guide to supervenience and determination” [teller 1999].
Under mind -body supervenience a physical base property , p, for mental property m guarantees, as a matter of necessity the , occurrence of m that is, necessarily if something instantiates p, it instantiates m . Physicalism as the thesis that ‘when you get down to it, everything is physical’ is notoriously hard to define in recent years ‘grounding’ has been appealed to formulate the physicalist thesis with varying degrees of attention to the implications. So, for example, mind–body supervenience holds that every mental phenomenon must be grounded in, or anchored to, some underlying physical base (presumably a neural state) this means that mental states can occur only in systems that can have physical properties namely physical systems.